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We explore  the  relationship  between  employee  trust  of  managers  and  workplace  per-
formance.  We  present  a theoretical  framework  which  serves  to  establish  a link between
employee  trust  and  ﬁrm  performance  as well  as to identify  possible  mechanisms  through
which  the relationship  may  operate.  We  then  analyse  matched  workplace  and  employee
data in  order  to ascertain  whether  the  average  level  of  employee  trust  within  the  workplace
inﬂuences  workplace  performance.  We  exploit  the 2004  and  2011  Workplace  Employ-
ment  Relations  Surveys  (WERS)  to  analyse  the role  of average  employee  trust  in  inﬂuencing
workplace  performance  in  both  pre-  and  post-recessionary  periods.  Our  empirical  ﬁndings
support a positive  relationship  between  three  measures  of workplace  performance  (ﬁnan-
cial performance,  labour  productivity  and  product  or service  quality)  and  average  employee
trust at  both  points  in  time.  Moreover,  this  relationship  holds  when  we  jointly  model  aver-
age employee  trust and  ﬁrm  performance  in  an  instrumental  variable  framework  in order  to
take  into  account  the  potential  endogeneity  of employee  trust.  We  then  exploit  employee
level data  from  the  WERS  to ascertain  how  individual  level  trust  of  the  employee  (rather
than the average  within  the  workplace)  is inﬂuenced  by measures  taken  by  employers
to  deal  with  the  recent  recession.  Our  ﬁndings  suggest  that  restricting  paid  overtime  and
access  to  training  potentially  erode  employee  trust.  In  addition,  we ﬁnd  that  job  or work
reorganisation  experienced  at either  the  employee  or organisation  level  is associated  with
lower employee  trust.
© 2015  The  Authors.  Published  by  Elsevier  B.V.  This  is an  open  access  article  under  the  CC
BY license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
. Introduction and background
Given the importance of identifying determinants of ﬁrm performance for understanding both economic growth and
roductivity at an aggregate level, it is not surprising that a vast literature exists exploring this issue focusing on a range of
easures of ﬁrm performance such as ﬁnancial performance (see, e.g., Machin and Stewart, 1990; McNabb and Whitﬁeld,
998; Munday et al., 2003) and labour productivity (see, e.g., Griliches and Regev, 1995; Oulton, 1998; Grifﬁths and Simpson,
004). Many of the studies in this area focus on the role of ﬁrm level characteristics such as capital and labour inputs in
etermining ﬁrm performance.It is apparent that employee behaviour may  inﬂuence ﬁrm level performance given that many employees have some
egree of discretion with respect to how hard they work (see, e.g., Brown et al., 2011, who  explore the relationship between
orker commitment and workplace performance). In this paper, we focus on employee trust, speciﬁcally employee trust
n management, which has attracted limited interest in the economics literature. Trust can be deﬁned as ‘ﬁrm belief in the
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reliability, truth, or ability of someone or something’  (Oxford English Dictionary, 2013). It may  be the case that employee trust
in the workplace inﬂuences the behaviour of employees, which in turn affects ﬁrm performance. In particular, the extent to
which employees trust that their managers will treat them honestly and fairly may  inﬂuence the extent to which employees
engage in opportunistic behaviour or otherwise.1 Thus, the degree of trust that employees have in their managers may
impact upon ﬁrm performance.
The role of trust in the economy is being increasingly recognised in the economics literature at both the macroeconomic
level, where there has been debate, e.g., on the relationship between trust and economic growth (see, e.g., Knack and Keefer,
1996, and, more recently, Algan and Cahuc, 2010) and at the microeconomic level, such as in the context of ﬁnancial decision-
making (see, e.g., Guiso et al., 2008, who explore the relationship between trust and stock market participation). A recent and
comprehensive survey of the literature is provided by Algan and Cahuc (2013). There are an increasing number of studies in
the economics literature exploring the determinants of trust at the individual level. These studies frequently use the standard
trust question from the World Values Survey and the General Social Survey: Generally speaking would you say that most people
can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people? (see, e.g., Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002; Bellemare and
Kröger, 2007). There has also been some interest in the applied psychology and human resource management literatures,
which have tended to explore the effects of speciﬁc workplace practices on employee trust. For example, Mayer and Davies
(1999) explore the effects of a performance appraisal system in one particular workplace, whilst Blunsdon and Reed (2003),
using Australian workplace data, ﬁnd signiﬁcant correlations between HR practices (such as having formalised policies and
procedures) and employee trust in management. There is also some evidence that the degree of autonomy workers have
over their work is associated with increased general trust, see Grund and Harbring (2009) for European evidence.
The literature on trust intersects with that of social capital where sometimes trust is seen as a component, source of, or
even a proxy for, social capital. The concept of social capital lacks a uniformly accepted deﬁnition with distinctions being
made, amongst other things, according to whether social capital is ‘associational’ or ‘behavioural’ (e.g., see Carpenter et al.,
2004), or whether the focus is on ‘external’ or ‘internal’ relations (e.g., see Adler and Kwon, 2002). According to Putnam
(2000, p. 19) “Whereas physical capital refers to physical objects and human capital refers to properties of individuals, social
capital refers to connections among individuals – social networks – and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that
arise from them.”
Regarding social capital formation, there are important parallels between social and other forms of capital. Glaeser et al.
(2002), who are concerned with the formation of social capital, analyse this issue using a model of optimal individual
investment adapting the standard approach used in the analysis of human and physical capital investment. They conclude
that in a large part (but with some important exceptions) individuals’ decisions to accumulate social capital can be understood
using the standard individual optimal investment model. Social capital formation can also be intergenerational with further
parallels to other forms of capital. Putnam (2000, p. 299) observes that “parents’ social capital . . . confers beneﬁt on their
offspring, just as children beneﬁt from their parents’ ﬁnancial and human capital.”
Regarding the effects of social capital, according to Putnam (1995, pp. 664–665) “social capital is the features of social life
– networks, norms, and trust – that enable participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared objectives”, which
suggests a number of mechanisms through which social capital can enhance economic growth. These mechanisms include
reducing transactions costs, uncertainty and informational asymmetries, increasing efﬁciency and facilitating co-operation
and coordination and dis-incentivising cheating. Positive associations between social capital and economic growth are
established under such arguments across a wide body of literature (examples include Knack and Keefer, 1996; Akc¸ omakak
and Ter Weel, 2009; Dearmon and Grier, 2009). However, another channel through which social capital may  affect eco-
nomic growth, which has recently begun to attract attention, is via entrepreneurship (widely recognised as an important
driver of economic growth). Bauernschuster et al. (2010) ﬁnd that social capital access, as measured by club member-
ship, has an important effect on entrepreneurship in small communities by helping mitigate resource constraints in the
absence of market-oriented solutions (e.g., venture capital ﬁrms) provided in larger communities. Kim and Kang (2014) ﬁnd
that entrepreneurship is facilitated by trust (in strangers or public institutions) and is positively associated with parents
emphasising to their children individual achievement relative to interpersonal relationships.
One speciﬁc relationship that has received little attention in the economics literature is the role of employee trust in
the workplace and its implications for ﬁrm performance.2 One interesting exception is La Porta et al. (1997), who explore
the Fukuyama’s (1995) argument that high levels of trust amongst individuals serve to enhance the performance of all
institutions in society including ﬁrms. They explore the effect of trust on the performance of large organisations in 40
countries. The relative success of large ﬁrms in a country is measured by the sales of the large ﬁrms relative to GNP, where
a large positive effect from general trust is found. A recent contribution in the ﬁnance literature by Goergen et al. (2013)
focuses on the implications of intra-ﬁrm trust for ﬁrm performance and reports empirical evidence of a positive relationship.
1 For instance, Kurtulus et al. (2011), using data from the NBER Shared Capitalism Survey, ﬁnd that employee trust in management is associated with
employees wanting a part of their pay to be related to company performance.
2 Bloom et al. (2012) examine the possible relationship between CEO trust in management and ﬁrm size and productivity. They augment the theoretical
model in Garicano (2000) to include CEO trust and show that greater trust allows greater delegation of problem solving, freeing up the CEO to have wider
impact  and sustain a larger organisation. Their theoretical priors are supported by empirical evidence that ﬁrms who have their headquarters in ‘high-trust’
regions are more likely to decentralise decisions to local plant managers.
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heir measure of intra-ﬁrm trust is based on responses to 64 questions covering staff communication, proﬁt-sharing, internal
romotion, staff turnover and training. Such measures serve to capture the degree of intra-ﬁrm trust somewhat indirectly
ather than employee trust per se. It is apparent that analysis of matched employee and ﬁrm level data may  be a fruitful line
f enquiry in order to shed further light on the relationship between ﬁrm performance and trust by exploiting more direct
easures of employee trust.
This paper seeks to ﬁll this gap in the existing literature. We  begin, in Section 2, by developing a theoretical framework
hich establishes a link between employee trust and ﬁrm performance as well as indicating possible mechanisms through
hich the relationship may  operate. In Section 3, we  analyse matched workplace and employee data in order to explore
hether average employee trust in managers within their workplace inﬂuences ﬁrm performance. To explore the robustness
f our empirical ﬁndings, we exploit the 2004 and 2011 Workplace Employment Relations Surveys (WERS) in order to
nalyse the role of employee trust in inﬂuencing workplace performance in both pre- and post-recessionary periods. We
lso consider empirical speciﬁcations where average employee trust is treated as an endogenous variable within the context
f an instrumental variable framework. Our empirical ﬁndings support a positive relationship between three measures of
orkplace performance (ﬁnancial performance, labour productivity, and product or service quality) and employee trust. In
ection 4, we exploit employee level data in order to ascertain the role of the recent recession and organisational changes
n employee trust to shed some light on how such trust is inﬂuenced in the workplace. Section 5 concludes the paper.
. Theoretical model
In this section we seek to establish a theoretical basis for our hypothesis of a link between employee trust and ﬁrm
erformance and to outline possible mechanisms through which the relationship may  operate. The framework we adopt
s relatively simple and serves to provide a background to the potential channels that connect various theories as to why
rust may  be an important concept regarding ﬁrm performance. We begin by observing that each of our measures of ﬁrm
erformance (ﬁnancial performance, labour productivity and service or product quality) can be enhanced by, amongst other
hings, eliciting greater employee effort, engagement with training, or, willingness to adopt new processes or workplace
rganisation. Our theory builds on principal–agent arguments to illustrate how higher levels of employee trust in managers
an help explain improvements in each of these ﬁrm performance-enhancing factors.
The principal–agent problem concerns a principal (here the manager), who  wishes to incentivise the agent (here the
mployee) to undertake an action that is, or may  appear to the agent to be, against their own  best interests. We  begin by
utlining a typical characterisation of the principal–agent problem.
Consider an agent with action set A ≡ {H, L}, whose choice of action a ∈ A affects the value of output, v(a) and their own
osts, ca, where cH > cL. Let H be the principal’s preferred action. Further, assume the principal is unable to observe the agent’s
ction (there is asymmetric information), or infer it from observing output (i.e. v(a) is not one-to-one). Since action H is costly
o the agent and unobservable to the principal, the principal knows the agent will have an incentive to select action, L.
To simplify matters, let v be an n-vector of feasible values of vi (i = 1, . . .,  n). Let pa be an n-vector of probabilities, with each
lement, pia
(∑n
i=1pia = 1
)
, being the probability that vi is observed given the agent’s action is a. Given that the principal
mploys a payment contract w(v), we construct the following – linear in cost – von Neumann–Morgenstern (expected) utility
unction, ua = u(w)pa − ca, for the agent, whom we assume to be risk-averse. We assume that the principal is risk-neutral, and
hat their objective is to design a payment contract w(v) to maximise (v −w)pH subject to the agent’s incentive compatibility
onstraint:
u(w)pH − cH ≥ u(w)pL − cL (1)
nd participation constraint, with reservation utility, u¯:
u(w)pH − cH ≥ u¯ (2)
We  now explore three framings of the principal–agent model to illustrate the potential channels through which trust can
nﬂuence our ﬁrm performance measures: the ﬁrst allows us to see how trust can be used to elicit performance-enhancing
ffort, the second provides insight into how trust can engender participation and co-operation or reduce costly resistance
o productivity/quality enhancing change, whilst the third demonstrates how trust can inﬂuence worker identity.
.1. Trust and effort3
In this section we let the elements H and L in the agent’s action set represent high (H) and low (L) effort. We  also augment
he basic model outlined above to include trust. We  begin under a scenario in which the agency problem yields an equilibrium
ith the agent choosing action L. The principal, in an effort to resolve the agency problem, wishes to assure the agent that
he contract that it offers, w(v), satisﬁes the constraints in Eqs. (1) and (2) and hence the agent should expect to receive
o less than wpH and expend no more than cH under the high effort scenario. However, it may  be difﬁcult for the agent
3 A similar argument is employed in Brown et al. (2011) to explain the potential link between worker commitment and loyalty and ﬁrm proﬁt.
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to independently verify the level of costs, cH, and the distribution of rewards, wpH. First, the agent may  have never chosen
the high effort option before and so may  have no personal experience of the associated costs and rewards. Verifying the
principal’s claims about the costs and rewards by observing others may also be difﬁcult remembering that the reward is
probabilistic over potentially many possible outcomes and effort is unobservable (e.g., is the colleague who  claims to be high
effort being honest?). Second, even if the agent has experience of the high effort option in the past, over time changes in the
economic climate, the ﬁrm’s environment, management personnel, structures and practices and so on, will mean that wpH
and cH will evolve over time such that past data may  no longer be helpful in verifying the principal’s current claims.
Let z represent the degree to which the agent can independently verify the claimed rewards and costs under the high
cost action and t be the level of trust that the agent has in the current principal.4 Furthermore, let the agent have beliefs
u˜H = u(w)pH − cH/ϕ,  about the expected net reward from the high effort action, where (z, t) ∈ [˛, 1], ϕ(z, t) ∈ [ˇ, 1] and
˛,  ˇ ∈ (0, 1) identify (ﬁxed) lower/upper bounds in the levels of expected reward and cost. Clearly, (z, t) and ϕ(z, t) should
be non-decreasing in their arguments (j, ϕj ≥ 0, j = z, t). Hence, even if the principal can design a feasible reward contract
w(v) which satisﬁes equations (1) and (2), if the reward distribution and/or costs of action H are difﬁcult for the agent to
independently verify (low z) and employee trust is sufﬁciently low (low t), it will not be possible to resolve the principal–agent
problem. However, even if z is low, higher levels of trust can increase the prospect of a given contract resolving the agency
dilemma, yielding effort level H and raising productivity, quality and/or ﬁnancial performance. Though the agent cannot
independently verify the claims of the principal they trust them sufﬁciently to take their word for it.
From the above discussion, we might expect z to be decreasing in, amongst other things, the complexity of the reward
contract and the volatility of the ﬁrm’s environment. Notice that higher levels of employee trust can act as a buffer helping
to mitigate the effects of increased uncertainty and volatility which can reduce z (for instance during a recession).
2.2. Trust, engagement with training and re-organisation
In this section we adopt a slightly different principal–agent framework. In this case the principal can directly observe
the action of the agent where H and L now refer, respectively, to high and low levels of investment/engagement in labour
training, ﬁrm re-organisation or changes in working practices (or conversely low and high levels of resistance to training or
re-organisation). Again, the principal’s preferred action is H.
Suppose that the principal wishes to uplift worker skills and/or reconﬁgure working practices or the working environment
so as to achieve a new, more proﬁtable, organisational regime. For simplicity, suppose that the principal can only achieve
this new regime in a future period if the agent undertakes action H (high engagement with training and/or low resistance to
change) in the current period. Otherwise, the status quo prevails. Hence we have two  regimes R ≡ {n, s}, where n represents
the new regime and s represents the status quo.
With no asymmetry in information about the action of the agent, the principal can set a determinate reward proﬁle for the
agent (wr, er) where wr is the wage and er is the working environment associated with regime r ∈ R. The principal’s objective
is therefore to design a reward proﬁle (ws, es; wn, en) so as to maximise n(wn, en) subject to an optimality constraint:
n(wn, en) ≥ ı + s(ws, es) (3)
where ı is the time-adjusted value of the cost of the organisational change and/or training; an agent incentive compatibility
constraint:
u(wn, en) ≥ ω + u(wS, eS) (4)
where ω is the time-adjusted cost to the agent of the organisational change and/or training; and a participation constraint,
with reservation utility, u¯:
u(wn, en) − ω ≥ u¯ (5)
However, in the absence of trust the agent may  heavily discount the claims of the principal in terms of the wage and
working conditions in the new regime, or anticipate a signiﬁcant understatement of the direct costs to the agent of under-
taking action H, i.e. the agent may  base its decisions on u(wn, en) and ω/ϕ instead of u(wn, en) and ω.5 Hence, even if the
principal can devise a feasible reward proﬁle which satisﬁes Eqs. (3)–(5), if trust is sufﬁciently low (i.e.  and/or 1/ϕ  are
sufﬁciently high) then the principal may  not be able to ﬁnd a reward proﬁle which incentivises the agent to opt for action
H. Again, increasing employee trust increases the range of contracts which are feasible and satisfy Eqs. (4) and (5) thereby
engendering the high-performance outcome for the ﬁrm.
4 In practice z would be expected to vary according to whether it refers to ability to verify (i) costs or (ii) the reward distribution. Here, for simplicity, we
make  no distinction.
5 It is not difﬁcult to see that an employer might have an incentive to cheat on the agent once the agent has undertaken the productivity-enhancing
training (especially if training develops ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital) or given up their original work practices, since these changes may  be largely irreversible.
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.3. Trust and worker identity
Finally, we consider the possibility that building employee trust can yield a change in worker identity along the lines
iscussed in Akerlof and Kranton (2005). In this case, the agent’s utility depends on their identity where agent identity is a
unction of organisational practices, or more speciﬁcally in the present situation, organisational practices which inﬂuence
mployee trust.
To illustrate, suppose the agent can have one of two identities, B ≡ {x, y}. An agent with identity x (y) has an associated
norm’ under which utility is maximised, in terms of the principal’s preferred (non-preferred) action in the above models,
ith action H (L) and deviation from this action results in loss of utility.6 If the agent’s identity is x then the principal can
timulate action H at a lower wage than if agent identity is y. Replacing the cost term ca in Eqs. (1) and (2) with:
ca = ka + b|k∗(b) − ka| − b
here ka is the agent’s cost under action a ∈ A, b represents the utility that the agent achieves with identity b ∈ B, whilst
b|k*(b) − ka| is a potential penalty incurred due to any divergence from the agent’s ‘ideal’ action given they have identity
. Hence investing to build employee trust to inﬂuence worker’s identity – changing worker identity from type y to type
 – reduces the penalty associated with action H, raising b. Since both effects diminish the ‘net cost’ term, enhancing
(w)pH − cH relative to u(w)pL − cL they increase the likelihood of H relative to L.
Having motivated the link between employee trust and workplace performance from a theoretical perspective, and
dentiﬁed potential mechanisms through which this may  operate, the remainder of the paper considers whether an empirical
elationship exists between trust and performance using matched employee–employer data.
. Average employee trust in managers within the workplace and ﬁrm performance
.1. Data and methodology
In order to explore the relationship between employee trust and workplace performance from an empirical perspec-
ive, we analyse data drawn from the Workplace Employment Relations Survey (WERS). The aim of the WERS is to provide
ationally representative data on the state of workplace relations and employment practices in Britain. We  focus on data
rawn from the most recent survey, namely the 2011 WERS, which is the sixth in the series. We  also explore the robust-
ess of our ﬁndings by analysing the 2004 WERS, which relates to the pre-ﬁnancial crisis period and, hence, allows us to
xplore whether the relationship between employee trust and workplace performance varies with the prevailing economic
limate. The survey population for both the 2004 and 2011 WERS is all British workplaces with at least 5 employees.7 The
ample for the 2011 WERS comprises 2680 workplaces, with the sample used in the econometric analysis discussed below
eing reduced to 1550 workplaces. For the 2004 WERS, the sample comprises 2295 workplaces, with the sample used for
ur econometric analysis including 1432 workplaces.8 The WERS comprises four main sections: the Worker Representative
uestionnaire; the Financial Performance Questionnaire; the Management Questionnaire; and the Employee Question-
aire. The ﬁrst three sections yield establishment level information, whilst the ﬁnal section (the Employee Questionnaire)
rovides employee level information. Our empirical analysis exploits data drawn from the Management and Employee
uestionnaires.
We conduct workplace level analyses in order to explore the determinants of three measures of relative workplace
erformance, namely: ﬁnancial performance, labour productivity and the quality of service or product. The workplace per-
ormance measures are derived from the following question included in the Management Questionnaire: I now want to
sk you how your workplace is currently performing compared with other establishments in the same industry. How would you
ssess your workplace’s (i) ﬁnancial performance (ii) labour productivity and (iii) quality of product or service? The management
epresentative was asked to indicate in which of the following categories ﬁnancial performance (FPw), labour productivity
LPw) and quality of product or service (qw) lay: (i) a lot better than average; (ii) better than average; (iii) about aver-
ge; (iv) below average or a lot below average, where w denotes the workplace subscript. From the responses to these
uestions, we have constructed three four-point indices where a value of 3 denotes ‘a lot better than average’, a value of
 denotes ‘better than average’, a value of 1 denotes ‘about average’ and a value of zero denotes ‘below or a lot below
verage’.6 For example, identity x (y) might represent a committed (non-committed) worker.
7 Workplaces in agriculture, hunting and forestry, ﬁshing, mining and quarrying, private households with employed persons, and extra-territorial
rganisations, are excluded.
8 In both 2004 and 2011 approximately 60% of the available sample is used. This is due to either: missing workplace identiﬁers and so we  are unable
o  match average employee trust, generated from the employee questionnaire, into the relevant workplace where the individual works; or that there are
issing values stemming from either the employee trust questions and/or ﬁrm level performance measures. An important caveat is that if this is not
andom then the potential for sample selection bias exists in the subsequent analysis.
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Workplace performance: % in each category
FPw LPw qw
2004 2011 2004 2011 2004 2011
A lot better than average 11.45 13.09 6.94 9.22 22.41 25.81
Better  than average 41.08 39.56 42.05 43.68 55.17 52.44
About  average 38.93 40.07 44.90 41.76 19.99 19.67
Below  average 8.54 7.29 6.11 5.34 2.43 2.08
The distributions of each of the three measures of workplace performance are given in the table above. These measures
of ﬁrm performance are clearly subjective and, in addition, the response rates, which are relatively consistent across 2011
and 2004, also suggest that bias exists towards responding in the average and above categories.9 It may  be the case that
the three workplace performance variables are subject to measurement error (see Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001; Forth
and McNabb, 2008). Random measurement error makes it difﬁcult to explain variations in workplace performance, whilst
if the measurement error is correlated with the explanatory variables, this leads to spurious correlation with the subjective
dependent variables (Brown et al., 2011). Such issues will arguably be mitigated since the data relating to the key explanatory
variables of interest are provided by employees (i.e. trust, which, as discussed in detail below, is elicited from responses
to the Employee Questionnaire) whereas the subjective workplace performance measures are provided by management
representatives. Less correlation is expected, therefore, between the measurement error in the measures of workplace
performance and the key explanatory variables.10
The measures of employee trust are derived from the Employee Questionnaire. In the 2011 and the 2004 WERS, up
to 25 employees from each workplace were asked to complete the Employee Questionnaire yielding samples of 17,295
employee–workplace observations in 2011 and 17,532 in 2004, after conditioning on missing data. The Employee Ques-
tionnaire contains information on a number of different measures of employee trust. To be speciﬁc, employees were
asked to indicate whether they strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree or strongly disagree with
the statements: Managers here can be relied upon to keep their promises (t1); Managers here deal with employees hon-
estly (t2); Managers here treat employees fairly (t3); and Managers here are sincere in attempting to understand employees’
views (t4). The responses to these four questions are used to create four trust indices which are increasing in the level
of employee trust and run from one (strongly disagree) to ﬁve (strongly agree). We  then match averages of the trust
measures in each work place (t¯1, t¯2, t¯3 and t¯4) with the workplace performance information to explore how the aver-
age level of employee trust prevailing in the workplace is correlated with workplace performance. Due to the possibility
of co-linearity between the four employee trust measures, they are included independently rather than simultaneously
in the speciﬁcation.11 Hence, four ordered probit speciﬁcations are modelled for each of the three measures of work-
place performance conditional on each alternative measure of employee trust, t¯w , and other explanatory variables, X1w, as
follows:12
y∗w = X ′1w + t¯w + εw (6)
where the unit of analysis is the workplace, w = 1, . . .,  W (in WERS 2011 w = 1550 and in WERS 2004 w = 1432) in which the
continuous latent performance of the workplace, y∗w , is observed in discrete form through a censoring mechanism: yw = j if
j−1 < y∗w ≤ j , with j outcomes and the ’s are unknown parameters to be estimated. Hence, the probability that alternative
j is chosen is the probability that the latent variable, y∗w , is between two boundaries j−1 and j.
It is interesting to note that, as shown in the table below, the average level of employee trust within the workplace,
i.e. t¯w = (1/N)
∑N
i=1ti where there are i = 1, . . .,  N employees in workplace w, is similar in the post (2011) and pre (2004)9 In the Financial Performance Questionnaire, continuous measures of workplace ﬁnancial performance, such as sales turnover, are available. However,
the  sample sizes are greatly reduced (roughly 25% of ﬁrms remain for the 2004 WERS), which is likely to lead to a non-random sample. Furthermore, Chaplin
et  al. (2005) state that a relatively high percentage of workplaces declined to take part in this section of the 2004 WERS, with a lower average response
rate  reported for those ﬁrms listed on the stock exchange. Similarly, the response rate for this part of WERS 2011 was  somewhat low at 31.8%, providing
information on up to only 545 workplaces (Van Wanrooy et al., 2013). Consequently, in what follows, we  do not analyse the continuous measures of ﬁrm
performance.
10 Furthermore, evaluations of these subjective measures of workplace performance have indicated that their ordinal properties are unaffected by such
bias  (see Bryson et al., 2005). In addition, comparisons of these subjective measures and objective proﬁtability and productivity data are found to be weakly
equivalent and produce similar results (Forth and McNabb, 2008). Similar evidence is reported by Wall et al. (2004), who  explore the validity of subjective
measures of ﬁrm performance.
11 Indeed, the pairwise correlation coefﬁcients between the four measures of trust are all above 0.7 and are all statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
12 We have also used a generalised ordered probit model and we  ﬁnd that the general pattern of results
remains.
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nancial crisis periods. In addition, it is interesting to note the similarity in the mean values of the four measures of employee
rust.
WERS 2011
Mean (standard deviation)
WERS 2004
Mean (standard deviation)
t¯1 3.3273 (0.6030) 3.2972 (0.5950)
t¯2 3.4779 (0.5848) 3.4627 (0.5753)
t¯3 3.4665 (0.5921) 3.4642 (0.5814)
t¯4 3.4357 (0.6099) 3.3991 (0.5771)
Number of observations 1550 1432
In each of the ordered probit models of workplace performance, controls in the vector X1w include: trade union density;
rm size; the aggregate wage premium paid in the workplace,13 industry (distinguishing between: manufacturing; electric-
ty, gas and water; construction; wholesale and retail; hotels and restaurants; transport and communication; ﬁnancial ser-
ices; other business services; public administration; education; health; and other community services); public sector; years
n operation; the average amount of training provided to employees; the proportion of experienced staff in the largest occupa-
ional group who had training in past year; the percentage of employees using computers; whether the workplace competes
t the regional (the omitted category), national or international level; the percentage of employees by occupation (dis-
inguishing between: managers and senior ofﬁcials; professional; associate professional and technical; administrative and
ecretarial; skilled trades; caring, leisure and other personal service; sales and customer service; process, plant and machine
peratives and drivers; and routine); whether the workplace operates a proﬁt share scheme; if employees can participate
n a share ownership scheme; if the workplace implements performance related pay; and ﬁnally whether a consultative
ommittee is thought to be “very inﬂuential” or “fairly inﬂuential” over managerial decisions which affect the workforce.
A potential criticism of the above empirical approach is that trust might be an endogenous covariate, i.e. it is plausible
hat ﬁrms which are performing well boost the trust of the employees and hence there is potential for reverse causality.
n order to address this issue we adopt an instrumental variable approach where we  jointly model ﬁrm performance and
verage employee trust in managers within the workplace. To do this we employ a set of instruments, X2w, which are strongly
ssociated with trust but arguably exogenous to ﬁrm performance. Hence, we  estimate the following joint model:
t¯w = X ′1w1 + X ′2w2 + 	1w (7a)
y∗w = X ′1w
 + t¯w + 	2w (7b)
The model is estimated simultaneously by a conditional (recursive) mixed process estimator (CMP), given that the depend-
nt variable in Eq. (7a), i.e. average employee trust in managers, is a continuous variable, and the dependent variable in Eq.
7b), i.e. ﬁrm performance, is an ordered outcome.14 The error terms 	1w and 	2w are assumed to be jointly normally dis-
ributed, i.e. (	1w, 	2w)
′∼N(0, ˙).  In terms of modelling the average level of trust of employees within the workplace we
nclude those covariates which are used to model ﬁrm performance, i.e. X1w, and a set of instrumental variables X2w. The
rst instrument we include is the proportion of employees within the workplace who  are religious. Employees are asked:
hat is your religion? From the responses to this question, we create a binary indicator equal to unity if the respondent states
ny category other than ‘no religion’. This variable is then averaged at the ﬁrm level to give the proportion of employees
ho state a religious denomination. Previous research has shown that religion can be used as an instrument for individual
ttitudes such as trust, e.g., see La Porta et al. (1997), Guiso et al. (2003) and McCleary and Barro (2006). The argument here is
hat there is a direct relationship between religion and trust,15 whilst there should be no direct association between religion
nd ﬁrm performance – only an indirect relationship operating through average employee trust in the workplace.16
As additional instruments we also include average responses from employees within the workplace to the following
uestion: In general how good would you say managers at this workplace are at keeping employees informed about the following?
i) Changes to the way the organisation is being run; (ii) Changes in stafﬁng; and (iii) Changes in the way you do your job.
gain the rationale for this set of instruments is that employee perceptions of managerial behaviour should engender trust.
ndeed, the recent literature suggests that those managers who positively inﬂuence workplace culture and keep employees
nformed through effective communication are perceived by their employees as trustworthy, e.g. see Whitener et al. (1998),
13 In an attempt to eliminate the effects of the wage premium upon employee trust we  adopt a two-stage approach. In the ﬁrst stage we estimate a
age  equation at the level of the employee, where the natural logarithm of the weekly wage is conditioned on age, ﬁrm tenure and highest educational
ttainment. The wage premium is then calculated by subtracting predicted wages from actual wages. After aggregating this variable at the ﬁrm level we
nclude it as a covariate in each of the ﬁrm performance outcomes. In doing so, the direct effect of the wage premium on trust is taken into account. We
re  grateful to an anonymous referee for this suggestion.
14 CMP is an appropriate estimator in this context given that there is simultaneity between trust and performance, but the availability of instruments
llows  the construction of a recursive set of equations, similar to a two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression. In the estimation of Eqs. (7a) and (7b) CMP is
 limited information maximum likelihood (LIML) estimator where the ﬁrst stage parameters are structural and the second stage parameters are reduced
orm,  see Roodman (2011). In the results we  report average conditional marginal effects from Eq. (7b).
15 Iannaccone (1998) was  an early paper in the economics literature arguing that religion can have a direct inﬂuence on trust.
16 Unfortunately, the information about religious denomination is only available to use as an instrument in WERS 2011.
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Cropanzano and Mitchell (2005), Fulmer and Gelfand (2012) and Gordon et al. (2014). Again we require that the instrument
is strongly associated with average employee trust within the workplace but exogenous to ﬁrm performance, something
which we test explicitly.
3.2. ResultsTable 1a presents the marginal effects relating to the effects of the employee trust measures on each category of the
workplace performance measures for the 2011 WERS, whilst Table 1b presents the analogous results for the 2004 WERS,
Table 1a
Workplace performance and employee trust (exogenous); ordered probit analysis; WERS 2011.
Panel A: Dependent variable = Financial Performance (FPw); Marginal effects
0 1 2 3
Trust  measures ME (t-stat) ME  (t-stat) ME  (t-stat) ME (t-stat)
t¯1 −0.0257 (−3.97) −0.0579 (−3.81) 0.0399 (3.80) 0.0436 (3.89)
t¯2 −0.0260 (−3.86) −0.0586 (−3.76) 0.0404 (3.77) 0.0443 (3.79)
t¯3 −0.0229 (−3.30) −0.0513 (−3.28) 0.0354 (3.29) 0.0389 (3.27)
t¯4 −0.0202 (−3.07) −0.0450 (−2.95) 0.0310 (2.98) 0.0342 (2.97)
Panel B: Dependent variable = Labour Productivity (LPw); Marginal effects
0 1 2 3
Trust  measures ME (t-stat) ME  (t-stat) ME  (t-stat) ME (t-stat)
t¯1 −0.0188 (−3.83) −0.0573 (−3.98) 0.0471 (3.98) 0.0289 (3.91)
t¯2 −0.0152 (−2.93) −0.0460 (−3.05) 0.0378 (3.02) 0.0234 (3.03)
t¯3 −0.0147 (−3.05) −0.0445 (−3.10) 0.0366 (3.10) 0.0226 (3.08)
t¯4 −0.0153 (−2.86) −0.0463 (−2.88) 0.0380 (2.85) 0.0235 (2.92)
Panel C: Dependent variable = Product or Service Quality (qw); Marginal effects
0 1 2 3
Trust  measures ME (t-stat) ME (t-stat) ME  (t-stat) ME (t-stat)
t¯1 −0.0104 (−4.02) −0.0659 (−5.92) −0.0089 (−2.09) 0.0852 (5.79)
t¯2 −0.0109 (−3.92) −0.0698 (−6.04) −0.0094 (−2.11) 0.0901 (5.86)
t¯3 −0.0099 (−3.53) −0.0625 (−5.09) −0.0084 (−2.12) 0.0808 (5.01)
t¯4 −0.0102 (−3.71) −0.0655 (−5.31) −0.0088 (−2.13) 0.0845 (5.28)
Note that each trust measure is included individually in Panels A–C rather than simultaneously. OBS = 1550.
Table 1b
Workplace performance and employee trust (exogenous); ordered probit analysis; WERS 2004.
Panel A: Dependent variable = Financial Performance (FPw); Marginal effects
0 1 2 3
Trust  measures ME (t-stat) ME  (t-stat) ME  (t-stat) ME (t-stat)
t¯1 −0.0294 (−3.50) −0.0510 (−3.16) 0.0436 (3.17) 0.0369 (3.42)
t¯2 −0.0255 (−3.33) −0.0439 (−3.02) 0.0376 (3.04) 0.0319 (3.25)
t¯3 −0.0181 (−2.20) −0.0310 (−2.07) 0.0265 (2.09) 0.0226 (2.15)
t¯4 −0.0287 (−3.49) −0.0496 (−3.22) 0.0424 (3.22) 0.0359 (3.43)
Panel B: Dependent variable = Labour Productivity (LPw); Marginal effects
0 1 2 3
Trust  measures ME (t-stat) ME  (t-stat) ME  (t-stat) ME (t-stat)
t¯1 −0.0260 (−3.72) −0.0673 (−4.08) 0.0644 (3.90) 0.0290 (4.16)
t¯2 −0.0253 (−3.75) −0.0651 (−4.06) 0.0623 (3.93) 0.0281 (4.06)
t¯3 −0.0191 (−2.57) −0.0488 (−2.65) 0.0467 (2.63) 0.0212 (2.64)
t¯4 −0.0277 (−4.02) −0.0716 (−4.28) 0.0685 (4.15) 0.0307 (4.35)
Panel  C: Dependent variable = Product or Service Quality (qw); Marginal effects
0 1 2 3
Trust  measures ME (t-stat) ME (t-stat) ME  (t-stat) ME (t-stat)
t¯1 −0.0088 (−3.24) −0.0557 (−3.60) −0.0006 (−0.21) 0.0652 (3.59)
t¯2 −0.0064 (−2.49) −0.0397 (−2.70) −0.0005 (−0.21) 0.0466 (2.65)
t¯3 −0.0070 (−2.71) −0.0438 (−3.12) −0.0005 (−0.21) 0.0514 (3.06)
t¯4 −0.0089 (−3.21) −0.0556 (−3.78) −0.0006 (−0.21) 0.0651 (3.72)
Note that each trust measure is included individually in Panels A–C rather than simultaneously. OBS = 1432.
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Table  2a
Workplace performance and employee trust (endogenous); ordered probit analysis; WERS 2011.
Panel A: Dependent variable = Financial Performance (FPw); Marginal effects
0 1 2 3
Trust  measures ME  (t-stat) ME (t-stat) ME (t-stat) ME  (t-stat)
t¯1 −0.0316 (−3.35) −0.0617 (−3.45) 0.0420 (3.45) 0.0514 (3.39)
t¯2 −0.0331 (−3.42) −0.0644 (−3.65) 0.0438 (3.64) 0.0537 (3.52)
t¯3 −0.0340 (−3.44) −0.0657 (−3.73) 0.0445 (3.71) 0.0551 (3.55)
t¯4 −0.0325 (−3.43) −0.0404 (−2.77) 0.0275 (2.76) 0.0335 (2.74)
Panel B: Dependent variable = Labour Productivity (LPw); Marginal effects
0 1 2 3
Trust  measures ME  (t-stat) ME (t-stat) ME (t-stat) ME  (t-stat)
t¯1 −0.0259 (−3.28) −0.0671 (−3.57) 0.0546 (3.56) 0.0384 (3.39)
t¯2 −0.0261 (−3.17) −0.0670 (−3.46) 0.0545 (3.45) 0.0387 (3.27)
t¯3 −0.0277 (−3.28) −0.0706 (−3.64) 0.0574 (3.63) 0.0409 (3.40)
t¯4 −0.0256 (−3.22) −0.0658 (−3.52) 0.0535 (3.51) 0.0379 (3.32)
Panel C: Dependent variable = Product or Service Quality (qw); Marginal effects
0 1 2 3
Trust  measures ME  (t-stat) ME  (t-stat) ME (t-stat) ME  (t-stat)
t¯1 −0.0165 (−3.84) −0.0784 (−5.01) −0.0097 (−2.35) 0.1046 (5.02)
t¯2 −0.0176 (−3.86) −0.0835 (−5.10) −0.0105 (−2.37) 0.1116 (5.09)
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st¯3 −0.0177 (−3.80) −0.0828 (−5.06) −0.0103 (−2.36) 0.1108 (5.04)
t¯4 −0.0168 (−3.87) −0.0798 (−5.09) −0.0100 (−2.38) 0.1066 (5.08)
ote that each trust measure is included individually in Panels A–C rather than simultaneously. OBS = 1550.
here in both instances trust is treated as an exogenous variable, focusing on the estimate of  in Eq. (6).17 Focusing initially
n Table 1a, it is apparent that, for ﬁnancial performance and labour productivity, trust is inversely related to being in the
about average’ and ‘below average’ categories and positively associated with being in the ‘a lot better than average’ and
better than average’ categories. So higher levels of average employee trust in managers (across all four measures of employee
rust) appear to be positively related to workplace ﬁnancial performance and labour productivity. With respect to product
r service quality, employee trust is positively associated with being in the ‘a lot better than average’ category and inversely
ssociated with being in the other three categories, the positive inﬂuence on the probability of reporting the highest level
f this measure of workplace performance being particularly pronounced in terms of magnitude. For example, focusing on
able 1a Panel C, it is evident that each alternative measure of trust, evaluated at the mean, increases the probability that
roduct or service quality is ‘a lot better than average’ by approximately 8–9 percentage points.
Turning to Table 1b, it is evident that the pattern of the results is consistent across the 2011 and the 2004 WERS thereby
ndorsing the ﬁnding that employee trust is positively associated with higher levels of workplace performance. There are,
owever, some differences across the two years in terms of the magnitude of the effect of employee trust on workplace
erformance. For example, the positive effect of employee trust on the probability of reporting the highest category for the
nancial performance measure (i.e. being ‘a lot better than average’) is higher in 2011 than in 2004, except for t¯4 where it is
arger in 2004. Similarly, the positive effect of employee trust on the probability of reporting the ‘a lot better than average’
ategory for the quality of product or service measure is considerably higher in 2011 as compared to the effect in 2004 by
round 2–4 percentage points. The largest differential in terms of magnitude is for whether managers are deemed to treat
mployees fairly, t¯2, at 4.4 percentage points. Conversely, the positive effect of employee trust on the probability of reporting
he ‘better than average’ category for labour productivity is much higher in 2004, i.e. pre the economic recession, than in
011.
Due to the potential endogeneity of average employee trust within the workplace, in Tables 2a and 2b we  replicate the
bove analysis based on an instrumental variable approach, where Eqs. (7a) and (7b) are estimated. For 2011 (2004), in the
rst stage the instruments are jointly signiﬁcant in determining each measure of average employee trust in the workplace
t the 1% level with an F-statistic between 293.5 and 397.9 (283.4 and 515.8), far in excess of the minimum threshold
uggested by Stock et al. (2002). Using a Sargan–Hausman test of over-identiﬁcation, the instruments are found to be jointly
tatistically insigniﬁcant in each of the ﬁrm performance outcomes in both 2011 and 2004, which satisﬁes the assumption
hat the instrumental variables are uncorrelated with the error term. Table 2a presents the marginal effects relating to the
17 For brevity, we  only present the results relating to the employee trust variables. The results relating to the other control variables, which
re  available on request, accord with the existing literature. For example, competing on an international level and the proportion of employee
 receiving training are positively associated with ﬁnancial performance, labour productivity and product/service quality. Firm size is positively asso-
iated  with ﬁnancial performance, whilst competing at a national level is positively associated with product or service quality. Operating in the ﬁnancial
ervices sector is positively associated with ﬁnancial performance and labour productivity.
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Table  2b
Workplace performance and employee trust (endogenous); ordered probit analysis; WERS 2004.
Panel A: Dependent variable = Financial Performance (FPw); Marginal effects
0 1 2 3
Trust  measures ME (t-stat) ME  (t-stat) ME  (t-stat) ME (t-stat)
t¯1 −0.0516 (−4.45) −0.0774 (−4.94) 0.0655 (4.93) 0.0635 (4.54)
t¯2 −0.0535 (−4.41) −0.0796 (−4.92) 0.0673 (4.92) 0.0658 (4.49)
t¯3 −0.0556 (−4.38) −0.0808 (−5.05) 0.0683 (5.05) 0.0681 (4.48)
t¯4 −0.0529 (−4.48) −0.0792 (−4.95) 0.0670 (4.95) 0.0651 (4.55)
Panel B: Dependent variable = Labour Productivity (LPw); Marginal effects
0 1 2 3
Trust  measures ME (t-stat) ME  (t-stat) ME  (t-stat) ME (t-stat)
t¯1 −0.0505 (−5.04) −0.1088 (−6.19) 0.1037 (6.22) 0.0557 (5.11)
t¯2 −0.0528 (−5.04) −0.1131 (−6.21) 0.1077 (6.25) 0.0582 (5.10)
t¯3 −0.0532 (−4.84) −0.1109 (−6.14) 0.1057 (6.18) 0.0584 (4.91)
t¯4 −0.0512 (−5.05) −0.1110 (−6.13) 0.1058 (6.16) 0.0564 (5.11)
Panel C: Dependent variable = Product or Service Quality (qw); Marginal effects
0 1 2 3
Trust  measures ME (t-stat) ME (t-stat) ME  (t-stat) ME (t-stat)
t¯1 −0.0134 (−3.19) −0.0620 (−3.70) −0.0001 (−0.02) 0.0768 (3.69)
t¯2 −0.0153 (−3.13) −0.0635 (−3.66) −0.0001 (−0.02) 0.0789 (3.64)
t¯3 −0.0163 (−3.18) −0.0671 (−3.80) −0.0001 (−0.01) 0.0834 (3.76)
t¯4 −0.0150 (−3.00) −0.0630 (−3.69) −0.0001 (−0.03) 0.0780 (3.67)
Note that each trust measure is included individually in Panels A–C rather than simultaneously. OBS = 1432.
effects of the employee trust measures on each category of the workplace performance measures for the 2011 WERS, whilst
Table 2b presents the analogous results for the 2004 WERS, where in both instances average trust in managers within the
workplace is treated as an endogenous variable, i.e. we focus on the estimate of  from Eq. (7b). As found previously, higher
average levels of employee trust in managers are associated with increasing ﬁnancial performance, labour productivity
and product/service quality. Moreover, the marginal effects are of a similar magnitude in comparison to where trust was
considered as an exogenous variable. For example, considering the magnitude of exogenous (endogenous) average employee
trust on the probability of reporting the ‘a lot better than average’ ﬁnancial performance in 2011 ranges between 3.4 and
4.4 (3.4 and 5.5) percentage points Table 1a (2a) Panel A.
Finally, whilst the WERS are cross-sectional data sets, which means that we conduct separate analysis for the 2004
and 2011 surveys, a sub sample of workplaces is, however, followed across the two  waves thereby allowing some panel
data analysis to be conducted. Once we condition on non-missing values for the variables used in our analysis, the sub
sample comprises 584 ﬁrms.18 We  further examine the robustness of the results by attempting to control for unobserved
time invariant ﬁrm level heterogeneity over the period, or potential omitted variable bias, by employing a ﬁrst difference
estimator as follows:
y(2011−2004)w = X(2011−2004)
′
1w  + t¯
(2011−2004)
w + w (8)
Changes in workplace performance over the period, y(2011−2004)w , are conditioned on changes in time varying covariates,
X(2011−2004)1w , and the change in the average level of trust in managers, t¯
(2011−2004)
w , within the same workplace between
WERS 2004 and 2011. Each measure of ﬁrm performance in 2004 and 2011 is based on a four point scale and hence the
change in performance over time y(2011−2004)w ranges from −4 through to +4 so we  estimate Eq. (8) by OLS. The results shown
in Table 3 reveal that a positive association remains, i.e. ˆ > 0, although, in accordance with expectations, the statistical
signiﬁcance of the trust variables is reduced (this is particularly evident for when labour productivity is the measure of ﬁrm
performance).19
Overall, our ﬁndings, which support the existence of a statistically signiﬁcant relationship between employee trust and
workplace performance, with high levels of employee trust in their managers being associated with higher levels of relative
workplace performance, are consistent with our theoretical priors. Moreover, these ﬁndings are robust across four different
measures of employee trust and three different measures of workplace performance, as well across the 2011 and 2004
18 Clearly, only a subset of the 2004 workplaces are followed through to 2011 and hence potential issues of attrition, due to either non response or the
exit  of a ﬁrm, should be borne in mind when interpreting the panel estimates.
19 As an alternative functional form, we have modelled ﬁrm performance in 2011 on the lag of the average employee trust measures, i.e. yw2011 =
g(t¯w2004, X1w2011), to reduce the possibility of reverse causality. Generally, this speciﬁcation yields similar results with average trust within the workplace
in  2004 having a positive association with each ﬁrm performance outcome in 2011.
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Table  3
Changes in workplace performance and employee trust over time (WERS 2004–2011); ﬁrst difference (ﬁxed effecs) estimates.
Change over time in ﬁnancial
performance (FPw)
Change over time in labour
productivity (LPw)
Change over time in product or
service quality (qw)
Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat
t¯1 0.0909 (1.10) 0.0295 (0.39) 0.1280 (1.99)
t¯2 0.1430 (1.79) 0.0155 (0.20) 0.1060 (1.51)
t¯3 0.1550 (1.96) 0.0057 (0.08) 0.1540 (2.35)
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St¯4 0.1800 (2.09) 0.0665 (0.85) 0.1340 (1.97)
ote that each trust measure is included individually rather than simultaneously. OBS = 584.
urveys. Indeed, there is some evidence that the inﬂuence of employee trust on workplace performance has become more
mportant during the recession. Again, this is consistent with our theoretical priors (see Section 2.1).
. Employee trust – the recession and organisational changes
.1. Data and methodology
Given that the ﬁndings presented in Section 3 indicate a positive relationship between the average level of employee trust
n managers within the workplace and ﬁrm performance, the natural next step is to ascertain what inﬂuences the degree
f employees’ trust in their managers at the individual level. We  therefore undertake a detailed analysis of the employee
evel data drawn from the WERS Employee Questionnaire. We  focus on the most recent WERS, i.e. the 2011 survey, since it
ncludes a set of questions relating to whether employees were inﬂuenced by the recent recession with respect to a variety
f aspects relating to their jobs. Again, in order to analyse the robustness of our ﬁndings, we  explore the determinants of the
our measures of employee trust (described in Section 3 above).
The distribution of employee trust appears to be consistent across the four measures as reported in the table below. It is
pparent that the majority of the responses across the four measures fall into the ‘agree’ category, with ‘strongly disagree’
eing the least populated category. Given that the trust measures are ordered ﬁve-point indices, we  use an ordered probit
peciﬁcation to model each of the four measures of trust as follows:
t∗iw = Z ′1w + Z ′2i + εiw (9)
here the unit of analysis is the employee, i = 1, . . .,  N, in workplace, w = 1, . . .,  W.  The continuous latent trust of the employee,
∗
iw
, is observed in discrete form through a censoring mechanism: tiw = k if k−1 < t∗iw ≤ k, with k outcomes and the ’s are
nknown parameters to be estimated. Standard errors are clustered at the workplace level to account for the possibility that
p to 25 employees may  be observed for each workplace.20
Employee trust measures: % responding in each category
t1 t2 t3 t4
Strongly agree 10.47 12.78 14.93 12.09
Agree  37.30 42.50 41.49 42.70
Neither agree nor disagree 29.76 26.14 23.84 24.48
Disagree 16.13 13.21 12.68 14.96
Strongly disagree 6.34 5.36 7.06 5.77
With respect to the explanatory variables, we  include a set of job and work related characteristics, Z1w, and a set of
ersonal characteristics, Z2i. We  control for the following job and work related characteristics: the natural logarithm of
he individual’s weekly contractual hours; the employee’s workplace tenure distinguishing between less than 1 year (the
mitted category), 1 to less than 2 years, 2 to less than 5 years, 5 to less than 10 years and 10 years or more; how much
raining he/she has received during the last 12 months either paid for or organised by the employer (excluding health and
afety training), none (the omitted category), less than 1 day, 1 to less than 2 days, 2 to less than 5 days, 5 to less than 10
ays, 10 days or more; trade union membership; the natural logarithm of the individual’s weekly gross pay minus that of
he average gross weekly pay in the same one digit industry in which they are employed,21 and perceptions of how well
anagers keep employees informed about changes in the workplace (as described in Section 3.1). With respect to personal
haracteristics, we control for gender, age, ethnicity, marital status, health status, education, number of children and whether
he employee states a religious denomination.
20 Our ﬁndings are robust to employing a random effects ordered probit framework.
21 Average industry level wages are deﬁned at the one digit SIC level (Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation, 2000), and are available from the Labour Force
urvey  via https://www.nomisweb.co.uk.
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Table  4
Determinants of employee trust; ordered probit analysis of employee level data; WERS 2011.
Dependent variable = t1
Coef. t-stat Mean
Job characteristics
Tenure 1–2 yearsa −0.1002 (−2.65) 0.0959
Tenure 2–5 yearsa −0.1513 (−4.80) 0.2346
Tenure 5–10 yearsa −0.1710 (−5.29) 0.2421
Tenure >10 yearsa −0.2048 (−6.17) 0.3101
Train <1 daya 0.0268 (0.94) 0.1217
Train  1–2 daysa 0.1159 (4.41) 0.1699
Train  2–5 daysa 0.1958 (7.93) 0.2364
Train  5–10 daysa 0.2092 (6.58) 0.1059
Train  >10 daysa 0.2417 (6.60) 0.0664
Trade  union membera −0.2759 (−13.62) 0.3783
Log  weekly hours −0.1760 (−7.41) 3.4252
Log  (gross wage − industry mean) 0.0609 (2.23) 6.4412
Religious denomination provideda 0.0590 (2.99) 0.7080
Informed about job changesa 0.5732 (24.57) 0.5128
Informed about staff changesa 0.4120 (16.52) 0.4963
Informed about organisation changesa 0.4995 (19.65) 0.5512
Experience of recession
Workload increaseda −0.1563 (−7.04) 0.2619
Work  was  re-organiseda −0.1289 (−4.95) 0.1803
Moved to another joba −0.0442 (−1.14) 0.0538
Wages frozen or cuta −0.0720 (−3.43) 0.3236
Non-wage beneﬁts reduceda −0.0948 (−2.44) 0.0507
Contracted work hours reduceda −0.1010 (−2.01) 0.0407
Access  to paid overtime restricteda −0.2479 (−10.47) 0.1679
Required to take unpaid leavea 0.0947 (1.15) 0.0174
Access  to training restricteda −0.1989 (−6.96) 0.1170
Cut  point 1 ( ˆ1) −1.7337 (−10.64)
Cut point 2 ( ˆ2) −0.7547 (−4.64)
Cut point 3 ( ˆ3) 0.3267 (2.02)
Cut point 4 ( ˆ4) 1.8696 (11.48)
Log pseudo likelihood −20,955.56
Wald Chi squared (52) 6029.88
Pseudo R squared 0.1554
Number of observations 17,295
Notes: Controls are also included for a set of personal characteristics: male; white; aged 18–19; aged 20–21; aged 22–29; aged 30–39; aged 40–49;
aged  50–59; aged 60–64; aged 65 and over; married; separated, widowed or divorced; number of children; currently has a health problem; and highest
educational attainment (whether GCSE, A level, ﬁrst degree or higher degree).
a Denotes a binary control.
Our focus on the 2011 WERS relates to the inclusion in the Employee Questionnaire of the following question: ‘Did any
of the following happen to you as a result of the most recent recession whilst working at this workplace? My workload increased;
My job was re-organised; I was moved to another job; My wages were frozen or cut; My nonwage beneﬁts were reduced; My
contracted working hours were reduced; Access to paid overtime was restricted; I was required to take unpaid leave; And access
to training was restricted’. Thus, we include a set of control variables capturing whether (as well as how) the individual
reported that he/she was affected by the recent recession where these are entered into Eq. (9) in the vector Z2i as binary
controls.22 It is apparent from the summary statistics presented in the ﬁnal column of Table 4 that 26% of employees felt
that their workload had increased as a result of the recession, with 18% reporting that their work had been re-organised.
Approximately 32% reported that their wages had been frozen or cut, contrasting with only 5% reporting that their non-wage
beneﬁts had been reduced. Access to paid overtime and access to training being restricted were reported by 17% and 12% of
employees, respectively.4.2. Results
In Table 4, for brevity, we present selected results relating to the coefﬁcients estimated in modelling t1, the ordered index
capturing the extent to which employees agree with the statement: Managers here can be relied upon to keep their promises.
22 It should be acknowledged that the variables capture the employee’s perceptions regarding whether and how they were inﬂuenced by the recession,
i.e.  they reﬂect the employee’s judgements regarding the perceived causation of the effects.
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iven our focus, we present the estimated coefﬁcients related to the job and work related characteristics.23 It is apparent
hat the amount of training received by employees is positively associated with employee trust, whereas workplace tenure,
ours worked and trade union membership are all inversely associated with employee trust. There is a positive association
etween higher levels of employee weekly wages earned in excess of the average in industry and trust in management.24
With respect to the set of variables relating to experiences due to the economic recession, with the exception of being
equired to take unpaid leave, it is apparent that the estimated coefﬁcients are all negative and generally, with the exceptions
f being moved to another job and required to take unpaid leave, highly statistically signiﬁcant. The marginal effects relating
o this set of variables are presented in Table 5 where it can be seen that the set of variables capturing whether or not
mployees have been inﬂuenced by the ﬁnancial crisis (with the exception of having to take unpaid leave) all have a positive
nﬂuence on being in the relatively low employee trust categories and a negative inﬂuence on being in the relatively high
mployee trust categories. Focusing ﬁrstly on t1, managers here can be relied upon to keep their promises, it is apparent
hat restricting access to paid overtime has a relatively large inverse effect on the probability of responding in the ‘agree’
ategory, at 7 percentage points, closely followed by the size of the effects of an increased workload and access to training
eing restricted, at around 5 and 6 percentage points, respectively. Moreover the effects related to these three variables are
ighly statistically signiﬁcant. The cumulative effect of the recession variables may  play an important role in inﬂuencing
mployee trust. Hence, in the second part of the table we present the marginal effects associated with an index of the number
f recession effects reported by the employee which ranges from zero to nine. The results indicate that a higher value of the
ndex is associated with an increased probability of reporting the lower categories of employee trust.25
Similar results are found for t2 and t3, managers here deal with employees honestly and managers here treat employees fairly,
espectively, with highly signiﬁcant effects also found for job re-organisation. A slightly different pattern of marginal effects
s found for t4, managers here are sincere in attempting to understand employees’ views, with negative effects found for category
 only. The largest inverse effect on reporting category 5 ‘strongly agree’ was  once again associated with restricting access
o paid overtime, with highly statistically signiﬁcant effects also found for restricting access to training, job re-organisation
nd increased workloads. For example, job re-organisation is associated with around a 4 percentage point lower probability
hat employees ‘strongly agree’ that managers treat employees fairly (see Panel D). It is noticeable across the four measures
f employee trust that being required to take unpaid leave does not appear to inﬂuence employee trust. Such a ﬁnding may
eﬂect differing values placed on having additional time away from work related to the earnings and effort associated with
eing at work.26,27
It is apparent that the changes experienced by employees due to the recession are changes experienced at the individual
evel. It is also interesting to explore the inﬂuence of organisational changes introduced at the workplace level on employee
rust and whether the inﬂuence of such changes on employee trust varies across the 2004 and 2011 WERS. Hence, we
xploit the responses to the following questions which were included in the Management Questionnaire and hence provide
nformation at the workplace level which we then match with the employee level data. In the 2004 WERS, management
epresentatives were asked: over the past two years has management introduced any of the following changes: introduction
f performance related pay; introduction or upgrading of computers; introduction or upgrading of other technology; changes in
orking time arrangements; changes in the organisation of work; changes in work techniques or procedures; introduction of
nitiatives to involve employees; and introduction of technologically new or signiﬁcantly improved product or service.  In the 2011
ERS, the second and third categories were combined as follows: introduction or upgrading of new technology (including
omputers). Hence, seven types of organisational change were identiﬁed in the 2011 WERS as compared to eight in the 2004
ERS.
We exploit this information to explore the relationship between employee trust and organisational change by re-
stimating Eq. (9) above replacing the variables associated with changes experienced by employees as a result of the recent
ecession with the organisational change variables described above. The results are summarised in Tables 6 and 7 below,
23 The analogous results for the other three employee trust measures are in line with those presented in Table 4 and are available on request, as are the
esults  pertaining to the effects of the personal characteristics of the employees. With respect to personal characteristics, being male and being in poor
ealth are consistently associated with lower levels of trust, whilst being white or Asian are associated with reporting higher levels of trust.
24 Whilst the ﬁndings here are mostly intuitive, the negative associations between trust and tenure and trust and trade union membership are a little less
bvious. Indeed, in the case of trade union membership and employee trust, Bryson (2001) ﬁnds that the association can be positive or negative depending
n  factors such as the balance of power between the union and management in the workplace, the extent to which management actively encourage union
embership and members’ perceptions of union effectiveness.
25 In order to further explore the robustness of our results, we distinguish between employees who  have been at the workplace pre 2008 and new hires.
or  those employees who are not new hires, we  ﬁnd similar results to those for the full sample; that is, the effects of the recession maintain a negative
ssociation with employee trust.
26 We have experimented with a variety of speciﬁcations. For example, we have incorporated controls for workplace characteristics such as: workplace
ize;  the percentage of employees dismissed over the last year; the percentage of employees made redundant over the last year; the frequency of meetings
etween senior managers and the whole workforce; and the number of committees of managers and employees primarily concerned with consultation
rather than negotiation). Workplace size, which is generally inversely associated with employee trust, is the only additional control to consistently exert
 statistically signiﬁcant inﬂuence. The pattern of results relating to the variables capturing the effects of the recent recession remains unaltered with
articularly statistically signiﬁcant inﬂuences found for: my workload increased; my job was  re-organised; my wages were frozen or cut; access to paid
vertime was  restricted; and access to training was  restricted.
27 In order to explore the robustness of our ﬁndings, we  repeat the analysis including workplace ﬁxed effects. The results are generally in line with those
resented above. However, in line with prior expectations, the statistical signiﬁcance of some of the explanatory variables is reduced.
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Table  5
Employee trust and the recent ﬁnancial recession; ordered probit analysis; WERS 2011.
Panel A: Dependent variable = Managers here can be relied upon to keep their promises (t1)
1 2 3 4 5
ME  (t-stat) ME (t-stat) ME  (t-stat) ME (t-stat) ME  (t-stat)
(i) Effects of recent recession
My workload increased 0.0092 (6.77) 0.0294 (7.00) 0.0234 (6.95) −0.0459 (−7.02) −0.0161 (−6.88)
My  job was  re-organised 0.0076 (4.91) 0.0243 (4.93) 0.0193 (4.91) −0.0379 (−4.94) −0.0133 (−4.91)
I  was  moved to another job 0.0026 (1.14) 0.0083 (1.14) 0.0066 (1.14) −0.0130 (−1.14) −0.0046 (−1.14)
My  wages were frozen or cut 0.0042 (3.45) 0.0136 (3.43) 0.0108 (3.39) −0.0212 (−2.45) −0.0074 (−3.40)
My  nonwage beneﬁts were reduced 0.0056 (2.42) 0.0179 (2.44) 0.0142 (2.44) −0.0279 (−2.89) −0.0098 (−2.43)
My  contracted working hours were reduced 0.0059 (2.00) 0.0190 (2.01) 0.0151 (2.01) −0.0297 (−2.01) −0.0104 (−2.01)
Access to paid overtime was  restricted 0.0145 (10.00) 0.0467 (10.36) 0.0372 (10.01) −0.0728 (−10.39) −0.0256 (−10.03)
I  was  required to take unpaid leave −0.0056 (−1.15) −0.0178 (−1.15) −0.0142 (−1.15) 0.0278 (1.15) 0.0098 (1.15)
Access to training was restricted 0.0117 (6.76) 0.0375 (6.90) 0.0298 (6.90) −0.0584 (−6.93) −0.0205 (−6.89)
(ii)  Index of recession effects 0.0079 (16.91) 0.0252 (19.18) 0.0200 (17.76) −0.0393 (−19.68) −0.0139 (−17.42)
Panel B: Dependent variable = Managers here deal with employees honestly (t2)
1 2 3 4 5
ME  (t-stat) ME (t-stat) ME  (t-stat) ME  (t-stat) ME  (t-stat)
(i) Effects of recent recession:
My workload increased 0.0081 (7.24) 0.0268 (7.60) 0.0321 (7.66) −0.0448 (−7.65) −0.0222 (−7.55)
My  job was  re-organised 0.0081 (6.52) 0.0268 (6.60) 0.0321 (6.53) −0.0449 (−6.59) −0.0222 (−6.54)
I  was  moved to another job 0.0020 (1.09) 0.0068 (1.09) 0.0081 (1.09) −0.0113 (−1.09) −0.0056 (−1.09)
My  wages were frozen or cut 0.0043 (4.45) 0.0141 (4.42) 0.0169 (4.40) −0.0236 (−4.42) −0.0117 (−4.41)
My  nonwage beneﬁts were reduced 0.0025 (1.32) 0.0083 (1.33) 0.0100 (1.33) −0.0139 (−1.33) −0.0069 (−1.33)
My  contracted working hours were reduced 0.0023 (0.91) 0.0076 (0.91) 0.0092 (0.91) −0.0128 (−0.91) −0.0063 (−0.91)
Access to paid overtime was  restricted 0.0087 (7.33) 0.0287 (7.57) 0.0344 (7.50) −0.0480 (−7.56) −0.0237 (−7.47)
I  was  required to take unpaid leave 0.0019 (0.49) 0.0064 (0.49) 0.0076 (0.49) −0.0106 (−0.49) −0.0053 (−0.49)
Access to training was restricted 0.0081 (5.89) 0.0267 (5.90) 0.0320 (5.95) −0.0447 (−5.92) −0.0221 (−5.97)
(ii)  Index of recession effects 0.0064 (16.29) 0.0210 (18.37) 0.0251 (18.24) −0.0351 (−18.75) −0.0174 (−17.80)
Panel  C: Dependent variable = Managers here treat employees fairly (t3)
1 2 3 4 5
ME  (t-stat) ME  (t-stat) ME  (t-stat) ME  (t-stat) ME  (t-stat)
(i) Effects of recent recession
My workload increased 0.0114 (7.08) 0.0243 (7.34) 0.0274 (7.35) −0.0375 (9–7.31) −0.0256 (−7.33)
My  job was  re-organised 0.0089 (4.69) 0.0189 (4.72) 0.0213 (4.70) −0.0292 (−4.71) −0.0199 (−4.73)
I  was  moved to another job 0.0002 (0.07) 0.0004 (0.07) 0.0005 (0.07) −0.0007 (−0.07) −0.0005 (−0.07)
My  wages were frozen or cut 0.0065 (4.50) 0.0138 (4.47) 0.0156 (4.45) −0.0213 (−4.47) −0.0145 (−4.46)
My  nonwage beneﬁts were reduced 0.0028 (1.03) 0.0061 (1.03) 0.0068 (1.03) −0.0094 (−1.03) −0.0064 (−1.03)
My  contracted working hours were reduced 0.0067 (1.71) 0.0143 (1.71) 0.0161 (1.71) −0.0220 (−1.71) −0.0150 (−1.72)
Access to paid overtime was  restricted 0.0142 (7.97) 0.0303 (8.06) 0.0341 (8.03) −0.0467 (−8.05) −0.0319 (−8.09)
I  was  required to take unpaid leave −0.0015 (−0.26) −0.0032 (−0.26) −0.0036 (−0.26) 0.0050 (0.26) .00341 (0.26)
Access to training was restricted 0.0094 (4.76) 0.0200 (4.79) 0.0225 (4.81) −0.0308 (−4.79) −0.0210 (−4.81)
(ii)  Index of recession effects 0.0085 (15.51) 0.0180 (16.56) 0.0203 (16.55) −0.0278 (−16.51) −0.0190 (−16.85)
Panel  D: Dependent variable = Are sincere in attempting to understand employees’ views (t4)
1 2 3 4 5
ME  (t-stat) ME (t-stat) ME  (t-stat) ME (t-stat) ME  (t-stat)
(i) Effects of recent recession:
My workload increased 0.0003 (4.66) 0.0094 (7.47) 0.0306 (7.68) 0.0280 (7.65) −0.0470 (−7.71)
My  job was  re-organised 0.0002 (3.70) 0.0071 (4.91) 0.0231 (4.93) 0.0212 (4.94) −0.0354 (−4.95)
I  was  moved to another job 0.0001 (0.74) 0.0016 (0.74) 0.0051 (0.74) 0.0047 (0.74) −0.0079 (−0.74)
My  wages were frozen or cut 0.0001 (2.99) 0.0039 (3.60) 0.0128 (3.60) 0.0117 (3.59) −0.0196 (−3.61)
My  nonwage beneﬁts were reduced 0.0001 (1.27) 0.0027 (1.30) 0.0088 (1.30) 0.0081 (1.30) −0.0135 (−1.30)
My  contracted working hours were reduced 0.0001 (1.19) 0.0036 (1.21) 0.0116 (1.21) 0.0107 (1.22) −0.0179 (−1.21)
Access to paid overtime was  restricted 0.0004 (4.76) 0.0113 (8.40) 0.0369 (8.73) 0.0338 (8.60) −0.0566 (−8.71)
I  was  required to take unpaid leave −0.0000 (−0.26) −0.0011 (−0.27) −0.0035 (−0.27) −0.0032 (−0.27) 0.0054 (0.27)
Access to training was restricted 0.0002 (3.59) 0.0070 (4.56) 0.0227 (4.56) 0.0208 (4.57) −0.0349 (−4.57)
(ii)  Index of recession effects 0.0002 (5.44) 0.0066 (15.39) 0.0214 (17.01) 0.0196 (16.89) −0.0328 (−17.44)
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Table  6
Employee trust and organisational change; ordered probit analysis; WERS 2011.
Panel A: Dependent variable = Managers here can be relied upon to keep their promises (t1)
1 2 3 4 5
ME  (t-stat) ME  (t-stat) ME  (t-stat) ME  (t-stat) ME  (t-stat)
(i) Organisational change in last 2 years:
Introduction of performance related
pay
−0.0042 (−1.80) −0.0125 (−1.81) −0.0100 (−1.81) 0.0194 (1.81) 0.0073 (1.81)
Introduction or upgrading of new
technology
0.0012 (0.83) 0.0036 (0.83) 0.0029 (0.83) −0.0057 (−0.83) −0.0021 (−0.83)
Changes in working time arrangements 0.0028 (1.93) 0.0085 (1.93) 0.0068 (1.93) −0.0132 (−1.93) −0.0050 (−1.93)
Changes in the organisation of work 0.0058 (3.93) 0.0172 (3.93) 0.0138 (3.89) −0.0267 (−3.93) −0.0101 (−3.91)
Changes in work techniques or
procedures
0.0029 (1.86) 0.0085 (1.86) 0.0068 (1.86) −0.0133 (−1.86) −0.0050 (−1.86)
Introduction of initiatives to involve
employees
0.0027 (1.90) 0.0080 (1.90) 0.0064 (1.90) −0.0124 (−1.90) −0.0047 (−1.90)
Introduction of technologically
new/signiﬁcantly improved product
0.0027 (1.86) 0.0081 (1.86) 0.0065 (1.85) −0.0125 (−1.86) −0.0047 (−1.86)
(ii)  Index of organisational change 0.0028 (7.72) 0.0082 (7.78) 0.0066 (7.62) −0.0127 (−7.77) −0.0048 (−7.72)
Panel  B: Dependent variable = Managers here deal with employees honestly (t2)
1 2 3 4 5
ME  (t-stat) ME (t-stat) ME  (t-stat) ME  (t-stat) ME  (t-stat)
(i) Organisational change in last 2 years:
Introduction of performance related pay −0.0027 (−1.34) −0.0081 (−1.34) −0.0097 (−1.34) 0.0134 (1.34) 0.0071 (1.34)
Introduction or upgrading of new technology 0.0002 (0.16) 0.0006 (0.16) 0.0007 (0.16) −0.0010 (−0.16) −0.0005 (−0.16)
Changes in working time arrangements 0.0020 (1.60) 0.0061 (1.60) 0.0072 (1.59) −0.0100 (−1.60) −0.0053 (−1.60)
Changes in the organisation of work 0.0056 (4.47) 0.0172 (4.49) 0.0205 (4.48) −0.0284 (−4.49) −0.0149 (−4.47)
Changes in work techniques or procedures 0.0017 (1.35) 0.0053 (1.35) 0.0063 (1.35) −0.0088 (−1.35) −0.0046 (−1.35)
Introduction of initiatives to involve employees 0.0028 (2.35) 0.0085 (2.36) 0.0102 (2.35) −0.0141 (−2.36) −0.0074 (−2.36)
Introduction of technologically
new/signiﬁcantly improved product
0.0016 (1.30) 0.0049 (1.30) 0.0058 (1.30) −0.0080 (−1.30) −0.0042 (−1.30)
(ii)  Index of organisational change 0.0022 (6.97) 0.0066 (6.97) 0.0079 (6.96) −0.0109 (−7.00) −0.0057 (−6.95)
Panel  C: Dependent variable = Managers here treat employees fairly (t3)
1 2 3 4 5
ME  (t-stat) ME (t-stat) ME  (t-stat) ME  (t-stat) ME  (t-stat)
(i) Organisational change in last 2 years:
Introduction of performance related pay −0.0043 (−1.38) −0.0086 (−1.38) −0.0097 (−1.38) 0.0130 (1.38) 0.0095 (1.38)
Introduction or upgrading of new technology 0.0010 (0.57) 0.0020 (0.56) 0.0022 (0.56) −0.0030 (−0.56) −0.0022 (−0.56)
Changes in working time arrangements 0.0026 (1.48) 0.0052 (1.48) 0.0059 (1.48) −0.0079 (−1.48) −0.0058 (−1.48)
Changes in the organisation of work 0.0050 (2.87) 0.0100 (2.86) 0.0113 (2.86) −0.0152 (−2.87) −0.0111 (−2.86)
Changes in work techniques or procedures 0.0029 (1.58) 0.0058 (1.59) 0.0065 (1.59) −0.0088 (−1.59) −0.0064 (−1.59)
Introduction of initiatives to involve employees 0.0032 (1.91) 0.0064 (1.91) 0.0072 (1.91) −0.0097 (−1.91) −0.0070 (−1.91)
Introduction of technologically
new/signiﬁcantly improved product
0.0019 (1.16) 0.0039 (1.16) 0.0044 (1.16) −0.0059 (−1.16) −0.0043 (−1.16)
(ii)  Index of organisational change 0.0025 (5.73) 0.0051 (5.72) 0.0057 (5.73) −0.0077 (−5.74) −0.0056 (−5.73)
Panel  D: Dependent variable = Are sincere in attempting to understand employees’ views (t4)
1 2 3 4 5
ME  (t-stat) ME (t-stat) ME  (t-stat) ME  (t-stat) ME  (t-stat)
(ii) Organisational change in last 2 years:
Introduction of performance related pay −0.0001 (−1.44) −0.0035 (−1.49) −0.0105 (−1.49) −0.0096 (−1.49) 0.0159 (1.49)
Introduction or upgrading of new technology 0.0000 (0.52) 0.0007 (0.53) 0.0022 (0.53) 0.0020 (0.53) −0.0033 (−0.53)
Changes in working time arrangements 0.0001 (1.64) 0.0023 (1.68) 0.0069 (1.68) 0.0064 (1.67) −0.0105 (−1.68)
Changes in the organisation of work 0.0001 (2.44) 0.0035 (2.62) 0.0107 (2.62) 0.0099 (2.62) −0.0163 (−2.63)
Changes in work techniques or procedures 0.0001 (1.27) 0.0018 (1.30) 0.0054 (1.30) 0.0050 (1.30) −0.0083 (−1.30)
Introduction of initiatives to involve employees 0.0001 (2.05) 0.0026 (2.05) 0.0080 (2.05) 0.0074 (2.05) −0.0122 (−2.05)
Introduction of technologically
new/signiﬁcantly improved product
0.0001 (1.70) 0.0023 (1.75) 0.0071 (1.75) 0.0065 (1.75) −0.0108 (−1.75)
(ii)  Index of organisational change 0.0001 (4.44) 0.0020 (6.02) 0.0061 (6.05) 0.0056 (6.02) −0.0093 (−6.07)
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Table  7
Employee trust and organisational change; ordered probit analysis; WERS 2004.
Panel A: Dependent variable = Managers here can be relied upon to keep their promises (t1)
1 2 3 4 5
ME (t-stat) ME (t-stat) ME (t-stat) ME  (t-stat) ME  (t-stat)
(i) Organisational change in last 2 years:
Introduction of performance related pay 0.0013 (0.61) 0.0040 (0.61) 0.0023 (0.61) −0.0058 (−0.61) −0.0019 (−0.61)
Introduction or upgrading of computers −0.0052 (−2.59) −0.0156 (−2.59) −0.0091 (−2.58) 0.0225 (2.59) 0.0075 (2.58)
Introduction or upgrading of other technology 0.0006 (0.35) 0.0019 (0.35) 0.0011 (0.35) −0.0027 (−0.35) −0.0009 (−0.35)
Changes in working time arrangements 0.0029 (1.70) 0.0086 (1.69) 0.0050 (1.68) −0.0124 (−1.69) −0.0041 (−1.69)
Changes in the organisation of work 0.0051 (2.86) 0.0153 (2.85) 0.0089 (2.83) −0.0220 (−2.85) −0.0073 (−2.86)
Changes in work techniques or procedures 0.0021 (1.15) 0.0064 (1.15) 0.0037 (1.15) −0.0092 (−1.15) −0.0031 (−1.15)
Introduction of initiatives to involve employees 0.0005 (0.24) 0.0016 (0.24) 0.0009 (0.24) −0.0022 (−0.24) −0.0007 (−0.24)
Introduction of technologically
new/signiﬁcantly improved product
0.0043 (1.72) 0.0129 (1.73) 0.0075 (1.72) −0.0185 (−1.72) −0.0061 (−1.72)
(ii)  Index of organisational change 0.0020 (4.58) 0.0060 (4.54) 0.0035 (4.46) −0.0086 (−4.55) −0.0029 (−4.52)
Panel B: Dependent variable = Managers here deal with employees honestly (t2)
1 2 3 4 5
ME (t-stat) ME (t-stat) ME (t-stat) ME  (t-stat) ME  (t-stat)
(i) Organisational change in last 2 years:
Introduction of performance related pay 0.0003 (0.18) 0.0010 (0.18) 0.0010 (0.18) −0.0015 (−0.18) −0.0008 (−0.18)
Introduction or upgrading of computers −0.0046 (−2.63) −0.0131 (−2.63) −0.0132 (−2.63) 0.0205 (2.63) 0.0104 (2.64)
Introduction or upgrading of other technology 0.0008 (0.53) 0.0023 (0.53) 0.0024 (0.53) −0.0037 (−0.53) −0.0019 (−0.54)
Changes in working time arrangements 0.0032 (2.31) 0.0091 (2.31) 0.0092 (2.29) −0.0142 (−2.30) −0.0072 (−2.30)
Changes in the organisation of work 0.0019 (1.21) 0.0053 (1.21) 0.0054 (1.21) −0.0083 (−1.21) −0.0042 (−1.21)
Changes in work techniques or procedures 0.0019 (1.23) 0.0055 (1.23) 0.0055 (1.23) −0.0086 (−1.23) −0.0043 (−1.23)
Introduction of initiatives to involve employees 0.0017 (0.96) 0.0049 (0.96) 0.0050 (0.96) −0.0077 (−0.96) −0.0039 (−0.96)
Introduction of technologically
new/signiﬁcantly improved product
0.0027 (1.26) 0.0076 (1.26) 0.0077 (1.26) −0.0119 (−1.26) −0.0060 (−1.26)
(ii)  Index of organisational change 0.0014 (3.85) 0.0041 (3.82) 0.0041 (3.78) −0.0064 (−3.82) −0.0033 (−3.80)
Panel C: Dependent variable = Managers here treat employees fairly (t3)
1 2 3 4 5
ME (t-stat) ME (t-stat) ME (t-stat) ME  (t-stat) ME  (t-stat)
(i) Organisational change in last 2 years:
Introduction of performance related pay 0.0002 (0.09) 0.0005 (0.09) 0.0005 (0.09) −0.0007 (−0.09) −0.0005 (−0.09)
Introduction or upgrading of computers −0.0080 (−3.68) −0.0158 (−3.68) −0.0164 (−3.66) 0.0246 (3.67) 0.0157 (3.68)
Introduction or upgrading of other technology −0.0000 (−0.02) −0.0001 (−0.02) −0.0001 (−0.02) 0.0001 (0.02) 0.0001 (0.02)
Changes in working time arrangements 0.0048 (2.55) 0.0096 (2.55) 0.0099 (2.54) −0.0148 (−2.55) −0.0095 (−2.55)
Changes in the organisation of work 0.0009 (0.48) 0.0019 (0.48) 0.0019 (0.48) −0.0029 (−0.48) −0.0019 (−0.48)
Changes in work techniques or procedures 0.0019 (0.94) 0.0038 (0.93) 0.0039 (0.94) −0.0058 (−0.94) −0.0037 (−0.94)
Introduction of initiatives to involve employees 0.0011 (0.44) 0.0022 (0.44) 0.0022 (0.44) −0.0033 (−0.44) −0.0021 (−0.44)
Introduction of technologically
new/signiﬁcantly improved product
0.0056 (2.01) 0.0112 (2.01) 0.0116 (2.00) −0.0174 (−2.01) −0.0111 (−2.00)
(ii)  Index of organisational change 0.0014 (2.77) 0.0027 (2.75) 0.0028 (2.75) −0.0041 (−2.75) −0.0027 (−2.76)
Panel D: Dependent variable = Are sincere in attempting to understand employees’ views (t4)
1 2 3 4 5
ME (t-stat) ME (t-stat) ME (t-stat) ME  (t-stat) ME  (t-stat)
(ii) Organisational change in last 2 years:
Introduction of performance related pay −0.0000 (−0.34) −0.0007 (−0.35) −0.0019 (−0.35) −0.0015 (−0.35) 0.0029 (0.35)
Introduction or upgrading of computers −0.0003 (−2.91) −0.0058 (−3.17) −0.0163 (−3.16) −0.0130 (−3.16) 0.0251 (3.17)
Introduction or upgrading of other technology 0.0001 (0.63) 0.0011 (0.64) 0.0030 (0.64) 0.0024 (0.64) −0.0046 (−0.64)
Changes in working time arrangements 0.0002 (2.47) 0.0039 (2.58) 0.0111 (2.56) 0.0088 (2.55) −0.0171 (−2.56)
Changes in the organisation of work 0.0002 (1.81) 0.0031 (1.89) 0.0087 (1.89) 0.0069 (1.89) −0.0134 (−1.89)
Changes in work techniques or procedures 0.0000 (0.35) 0.0006 (0.35) 0.0017 (0.35) 0.0013 (0.35) −0.0026 (−0.35)
Introduction of initiatives to involve employees 0.0000 (0.20) 0.0004 (0.20) 0.0012 (0.20) 0.0009 (0.20) −0.0018 (−0.20)
Introduction of technologically
new/signiﬁcantly improved product
0.0002 (1.69) 0.0040 (1.71) 0.0112 (1.71) 0.0089 (1.71) −0.0172 (−1.71)
(ii)  Index of organisational change 0.0001 (3.13) 0.0013 (3.41) 0.0038 (3.36) 0.0030 (3.35) −0.0058 (−3.37)
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hich present the marginal effects associated with the organisational change variables. Table 6 presents the results relating
o the 2011 WERS and Table 7 presents the results relating to the 2004 WERS. As above, it may  be the case that employee
rust is inﬂuenced by the cumulative effects of the various types of organisational change. Hence, in the second part of each
able, we replace the set of organisational change dummy  variables with an index denoting the number of types of change
ntroduced by the organisation over the last 2 years. For the 2011 WERS, the index runs from zero to seven, whilst for the
004 WERS the index runs from zero to eight.
It is apparent that there is only one organisational change variable that achieves statistical signiﬁcance in the 2011
ERS across all four measures of employee trust, namely, changes in the organisation of work. In addition, the introduction of
nitiatives to involve employees is found to be statistically signiﬁcant in two  measures of employee trust, these are: managers
ere deal with employees honestly; and managers here are sincere in attempting to understand employees’ views. These two
ypes of organisational change are generally associated with an increased probability of reporting trust in the lowest three
ategories and inversely associated with reporting trust in the highest two categories. Thus, the ﬁndings suggest that this
ype of organisational change, in line with the effects of changes associated with the recent recession, erodes employee
rust. These effects are, however, smaller in magnitude than those capturing the effects of the recent recession. In 2011,
one of the other types of organisational change appear to inﬂuence employee trust. For the index of the number of types
f organisational change, across the four measures of employee trust, an inverse relationship is apparent.
Interestingly, if the set of organisational change variables is included as well as the set of variables capturing the effects of
he recent recession, the pattern of the effects associated with the effects of the recent recession generally remains in terms
f sign and statistical signiﬁcance, although, as expected, some of the marginal effects are slightly smaller in magnitude. The
nly organisational change measures to exert statistically signiﬁcant inﬂuences are changes in the organisation of work and
he introduction of initiatives to involve employees,  with the ﬁndings suggesting that these changes are associated with lower
mployee trust. The estimated magnitudes of these effects are small in comparison to those associated with the variables
apturing the effects of the recent recession.
For the 2004 WERS, with the exception of managers can be relied upon to keep their promises, it is apparent that changes
n working time arrangements are inversely associated with employee trust, whilst changes in the organisation of work is
nversely associated with one of the employee trust measures, namely, managers here can be relied upon to keep their promises.
nterestingly, in the pre-recession period, there is one type of organisational change, introduction or upgrading of computers,
hich is positively associated with employee trust, that is, being inversely associated with reporting the relatively low levels
f trust and positively associated with reporting the high levels of trust. Dolton and Makepeace (2004) report a substantial
age premium associated with computer use for some individuals in the UK. Thus, the ﬁndings may  partially reﬂect wage
ncreases experienced or expected with such changes. The ﬁndings therefore suggest that certain types of organisational
hange may  serve to enhance employee trust.28 In Section 2, we  set out a theoretical framework to consider how employee
rust can facilitate beneﬁcial organisation practices engendering workplace performance-enhancing behaviour. The same
ramework can be used equally well to explain the reverse situation: practices that damage trust and reduce workplace
erformance. In this section we have found evidence of both types of practice, although the results relating to the index of
rganisational change suggest an inverse relationship between employee trust and the number of types of organisational
hange introduced.
. Conclusion
We  have explored the relationship between employee trust and workplace performance from a theoretical and an empiri-
al perspective. Our theoretical framework has established a link between employee trust and ﬁrm performance and has also
ndicated possible mechanisms through which such a relationship may  operate. Our empirical ﬁndings, based on matched
orkplace and employee data from the WERS 2004 and 2011, support a positive relationship between three measures of
orkplace performance (ﬁnancial performance, labour productivity and product or service quality) and four measures of
mployee trust (based upon the average level of trust in managers within the workplace). Our ﬁndings are generally similar
cross 2004 and 2011 with the exception that the effect of employee trust on ‘the better than average’ category for labour
roductivity is much higher in 2004, i.e. pre the economic recession, than in 2011. The analysis is also robust to explicitly
ointly modelling ﬁrm performance and average trust in managers within the workplace through an instrumental variable
pproach in order to take into account potential endogeneity issues and the results are also generally robust to estimating
y ﬁxed effects.
Having established a relationship between average employee trust in managers in the workplace and workplace per-
ormance, we subsequently focus on WERS 2011 in order to explicitly examine how trust at the employee level has been
nﬂuenced by the recent recession and organisational changes. It is apparent that restricting paid overtime potentially erodes
mployee trust, whilst requiring employees to take unpaid leave appears to have no effect on employee trust. In addition,
28 If we  combine the variables representing the introduction or upgrading of computers and the introduction or upgrading of other technology in the
004  WERS, in line with the results presented in Table 7, we  ﬁnd positive effects associated with this type of organisational change. We  present the ﬁndings
ssociated with keeping these two categories separate in order to allow a more precise deﬁnition of the types of change and to tie in with the speciﬁc
uestion included in the Management Questionnaire.
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we ﬁnd that job or work reorganisation experienced at either the employee or organisational level are associated with lower
employee trust. Our ﬁndings therefore highlight the importance of employee trust for workplace performance as well as
shedding some light on how such trust is inﬂuenced by job and work related characteristics.
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